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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“I have referred to this problem as the problem of the “civil rights of robots” 
because that is what it may become, and much faster than any of us now expect. 
Given the ever-accelerating rate of both technological and social change, it is 
entirely possible that robots will one day exist, and argue “we are alive; we are 
conscious!”” 
- Hilary Putnam (1964)1 
Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the 
droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They 
can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, 
they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even 
language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the 
films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social 
interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such 
a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to 
them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we 
currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the 
attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-
fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most 
(a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), 
leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution? 
                                                             
1
 Putnam, Hilary. “Robots: Machines or artificially created life?” The Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 21 
(1964): p.678 
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The possibility of a being like Data or C3PO eventually existing is surely 
not just science-fiction. At the outset, I will stipulate that there are no machines 
with which we regularly come into contact that deserve moral consideration, and 
probably no such machine in the world. However, as machines such as robots 
become more complex, we may start to encounter social robotic companions that 
behave in ways that we currently associate only with other humans. Certainly, 
there are many futurists who predict an increase in both the complexity of robots, 
and the complexity and frequency of our interactions with them. When Bill Gates 
started Microsoft in 1975, he envisioned a PC in every home2; now, in an article in 
Scientific American in 2007, Gates has predicted “A Robot in Every Home” 3. The 
government of South Korea has announced a plan to put a robot in the homes of 
all its citizens by 20134.  With these predictions and policies come anticipations of 
the moral issues that would arise from a significant increase in the social 
complexity of robots. There already exists a society that is to robots as the SCPCA 
is to animals; the ASPCR (the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Robots) claims to have been “Upholding Robotic Rights since 1999” (although 
they also note that they are “exactly as serious as robots are sentient”, which may 
mean, at this point at least, not very)5. 
                                                             
2 Microsoft. “Microsoft’s Tradition of Innovation: From Revolution to Evolution”, October 25 2002, 
http://www.microsoft.com/About/CompanyInformation/ourbusinesses/profile.mspx, accessed 
20/02/2011 
3 Gates, Bill. “A Robot in every Home.” Scientific American 296, no. 1 (January 2007): pp. 58-65. 
4 Garreau, Joel. “Bots on the Ground.” The Washington Post, May 6, 2007 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/05/AR2007050501009.html , 
accessed 21/11/2009. 
5 ASPCR, “The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Robots,” (n.d.) 
http://www.aspcr.com/ , accessed 06/03/2010. 
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The possibility of having obligations to machines has also been considered 
by some philosophers. In 1964, Hilary Putnam predicted that technology will 
advance to the point that we will eventually have to deal with “the problem of the 
civil rights of robots"6. Michael Tooley briefly mentions the possibility of robots 
being given moral consideration in Abortion and Infanticide where he writes that 
the possibility of very advanced robots could bring the disagreement between 
materialist and dualists from its typical position in metaphysical discussion to the 
centre-stage of ethical discourse, causing “very serious moral disagreement about 
everyday matters"7. In 2009, Peter Singer and Agata Sagan wrote in the Guardian 
(and in an article in Free Inquiry magazine in 20108), of the need to consider the 
possibility that some robots that may be developed that would be sentient, and 
hence (Singer and Sagan claimed) worthy of moral consideration9. Several others, 
both philosophers and those who specialise in relevant fields outside of 
philosophy, such as cognitive science and robotics, have also made valuable 
contributions to this topic, including Steve Torrance, Mark Coeckelbergh, and 
Joanna Bryson. 
The goal of this thesis is to answer the question of whether a machine 
could be morally considerable, and the problem will be considered from a 
standpoint that assumes a utilitarian perspective. The work takes seriously Peter 
Singer's claims in “When robots have feelings”, that machines could eventually be 
                                                             
6 Putnam, p.678 
7 Tooley, Michael. Abortion and Infanticide. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p.89 
8 Singer, Peter, and Agata Sagan. “No Rights for Robots? Never?” Free Inquiry, June/July 2010: 13, 
39 
9 Singer, Peter, and Agata Sagan.  “When robots have feelings,” December 14, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/14/rage-against-machines-robots , accessed 
06/03/2010 
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morally considerable, and asks whether this view is consistent with utilitarian 
views and particularly with those views advocated by Singer. In Singer’s 
worldview there are three types of being (as described here by Philip Cole): 
Non-persons that are non-sentient; non-persons that are 
sentient; and persons. It is not possible to morally harm the first 
category at all; it is possible to harm the second category, but not 
by killing them; and it is only the third category that can be 
morally harmed by being killed.10 
The main aim of this thesis is to ascertain which category (if any) an advanced 
robot similar to those seen in science-fiction would fall under, and what the 
ethical implications of this would be. 
The importance of addressing these ethical issues is made clearer when 
we consider the likely magnitude of the harm that could be caused if we fail to 
address them. If Gates and others are correct, and machines do become part of 
our daily lives in the future, there will be significant amount of human-machine 
interaction. If we have not been able to clarify our ethical position on the matter 
in advance, there is the potential for widespread harm. Steve Torrance considers 
our current position with regards to robots to be similar to the position of our 
society 100 years ago, when cars were first becoming a part of citizens' lives, and 
suggests that more action in developing guidelines in these early days of the 
technology would have saved lives11. If robots are possible subjects of harm, but 
                                                             
10 Cole, Phillip. “Problems with “Persons”” Res Publica, Vol.III, no.2 (1997) p.179. 
11 Torrance, Steve. “Ethics and consciousness in artificial agents.” AI & SOCIETY 22, no. 4 (3, 2007): 
p.498 
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are not treated as such, then (if predictions of the proliferation into society of a 
large amount of robots are true) the result would be nothing short of a moral 
disaster. If however, they are not the type of thing that can be harmed, then 
resources that could be used for their protection would be better spent on 
humans rather than machines, whenever there is a conflict. It is important that 
these ethical issues are considered as soon as possible, to minimise moral 
mistakes in the future.12 
A few notes on terminology and definitions: In the discussion below, the 
word “machine” is used interchangeably with “robot”, and “android”, without, I 
think, affecting the force of the argument. A dictionary definition of “machine” is: 
“an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a 
definite function and together performing a particular task”13. However, this 
definition is much too broad, as it can be interpreted to include humans and 
animals (John Searle uses the word “machine” in this way14), which are not the 
intended subjects of the thesis. In this thesis, the word “machines” will be used in 
its colloquial sense, and a brief definition of my own devising, that captures the 
sort of entity I have in mind for the subject of this thesis is: “an artificial entity 
with moving or electronic parts, manufactured out of inorganic materials such as 
metal and plastic”. Not too much emphasis should be placed on the exact wording 
                                                             
12 Torrance, p.498 (f.n.) 
13 Oxford Reference Online. "Machine Noun" in Oxford Dictionary of English, edited by Angus 
Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 2010. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.e0489390, accessed 
7/02/2011. 
14 For example: "There is no question that machines can think, because human and animal brains 
are precisely such machines.", from Searle, John R. “Twenty One Years In The Chinese Room.” In 
Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, edited by John 
Preston and Mark Bishop: 51-69. Oxford ; New York : Clarendon Press, 2002: p.56 
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of this definition, but this reflects the familiar use of the word, where machines 
are artefacts, categorical opposites of living things like animals and plants. In this 
thesis, the word “rights” will be avoided, since the idea of rights is sometimes 
thought to be problematic, and may be even more so for non-natural beings. So 
rather than use the term “rights”, this thesis will be concerned with whether or 
not machines can be “morally considerable”. This terminology is consistent with 
Peter Singer’s own avoidance of the term “rights”15. 
The discussion that follows will be primarily about whether or not things 
can be directly morally considerable. A thing might plausibly be said to be morally 
considerable because we have obligations regarding that thing, even if it makes 
no sense to say that we have obligations to it. For example, even if I believe that 
animals cannot be morally harmed and I don't believe my neighbour's dog is 
morally valuable in itself, I might refrain from shooting it out of respect for my 
neighbour's interests. Similarly, as robots today are generally the property of an 
individual or a company, in one sense we already have obligations regarding 
some robots (such as to refrain from destroying or stealing them), just as we do 
with any property that is not our own. In this thesis, if a being is said to be morally 
considerable, then it is so for its own sake, not because of its relationship to any 
other being. While it may be that a future android should not be “mistreated” 
because it is someone else's property, this is not a harm to the android, but an 
indirect harm to another being. This distinction will prove important later on, but 
the first two chapters are primarily concerned with the direct moral 
considerability of machines. 
                                                             
15 For example, see Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. 2nd ed. New York, N.Y: New York Review of 
Books, 1990: p.8 
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Before moving on to the next chapter, I will frame the central thesis 
question in the form of an ethical dilemma. At the conclusion of this thesis, we 
should be able to provide a satisfactory answer to the question posed in this 
thought experiment: 
Situation 1: The Spaceship Captain’s Dilemma 
Suppose that you are the Captain of a spaceship and that you must 
send one member of your crew on a particularly dangerous 
mission, which must be completed in order to save your ship from 
destruction. The mission involves entering the ship of a 
particularly violent alien species, and you believe that it is a suicide 
mission, likely to involve the death or destruction of the crew 
member that is selected. On the ship, there are only two crew 
members capable of performing the mission, and the nature of the 
task means that each is equally capable of success. You must 
choose to either send: 
1)  Adam: A human crew member. OR 
2) Andrew: A humanoid robot almost indistinguishable from 
a human person. 
Which of the crew should you send to almost certain destruction? As Adam is a 
person, he is morally considerable, so to make a decision in this situation, we 
need to know whether Andrew is also morally considerable. To get an 
understanding of whether Andrew is morally considerable requires answering a 
[10] 
 
series of questions, each of which will be the subject of a chapter or section of the 
thesis. The second chapter asks the question: “What makes a being morally 
considerable?” This chapter explores the concept of moral considerability 
according to utilitarian thinkers like Singer, and provides an indication of what to 
look for in a morally considerable being: sentience (or phenomenally conscious 
states that are qualitatively good or bad). The third chapter addresses the 
question of whether a machine could satisfy conditions for moral considerability. 
Finding an answer to this question will prove to be a challenge. The Problem of 
Other Minds will be considered as it relates to machines, and reasons will be 
given as to why the Problem of Machine Minds has greater implications for our 
metaphysical judgements about machines than the traditional problem of Other 
Minds has for humans and animals. The fourth chapter asks the question: “Can a 
machine be a person?” Given the behavioural similarity of machines like Data or 
C3PO to persons, it is natural that we should wonder whether these robots are 
moral persons. In chapter 4, I distinguish between “hard” persons (the traditional 
understanding of what a person is), “soft” persons (that have the behavioural 
aspects of personhood, but which are not conscious) and “fuzzy” persons 
(machines like Andrew). I argue that the preferences of “fuzzy” persons have less 
moral importance than the equivalent preferences of “hard” persons due to 
greater doubt over their sentience. I will establish several principles of machine 
ethics that will be defended within this work. At the end of the thesis, I propose 
that the decision of whether to perform an action that results in the satisfaction 
or frustration of a machine’s apparent preferences can be represented by an 
utilitarian equation. This equation can be used to resolve problems like the 
[11] 
 
dilemma introduced above. To begin, we should ask what it means to say that 
something is “morally considerable”. That is the subject of the next chapter.  
[12] 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: WHAT MAKES A BEING 
MORALLY CONSIDERABLE? 
“Consciousness matters. Arguably, it matters more than anything.” 
– Nicholas Humphrey16 
To explore the question posed in the Spaceship Captain's Dilemma, we 
need to know whether Andrew is morally considerable, so we need to know what 
it means to say that a being is “morally considerable”. Once we understand what 
types of things can be morally considerable, we can then ask whether or not a 
machine could be one of those things. As noted, this thesis assumes a utilitarian 
standpoint, so in the discussion that follows, I will stipulate that the ethical 
principle that sentience is both necessary and sufficient for moral considerability 
is true. Later in the chapter, an in-depth analysis of the notion of sentience will 
help to provide a practical indication of what to look for in a morally considerable 
machine. 
According to Singer, an act is wrong or right according to the degree to 
which it satisfies a being’s preferences, but it is clear from Singer's work that it is 
not just any preferences that count; only the preferences of sentient beings count 
as morally important; Singer holds the view that sentience is both necessary and 
sufficient for moral considerability. He argues that sentience is necessary for 
moral consideration because sentience is required for being to have morally 
                                                             
16
 Humphrey, Nicholas. Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006: p.2 
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significant interests, and without sentience as a boundary, there is no non-
arbitrary way to distinguish between the interests of things that we think of as 
considerable and those that are not considerable17. For a being’s interests to be 
morally important requires that the being is capable of phenomenal experience. It 
is quite possible to speak of entities such as blades of grass having interests, but 
according to Singer these interests are not morally important interests. They are 
not morally important interests because they lack an essential phenomenal 
element that is part of the suffering of sentient creatures. Singer points out that, 
unlike in the case of animals, where we can use our imagination to approximate 
what it might be like to be an animal when they suffer, in the case of non-sentient 
beings like trees, there is nothing that it is like to be them when their interests are 
frustrated18. Moral empathy requires that we can put ourselves in the position of 
the other, and to imagine how they might be feeling; a clear impossibility in the 
case of non-sentient beings. 
We ought to also consider sentience necessary for moral considerability 
because, without this boundary, we are led to an implausible conclusion: that we 
ought to consider as morally important the interests of things that common-sense 
tells us are not morally considerable. If I must take into account the interests of 
trees as morally significant, then why not cars or laptops, which can also plausibly 
be seen as having interests? It is true that trees may be said to be “auto-poietic” 
because their goals are inherent or self-created, in a way that perhaps the 
interests of cars are not19, but this doesn't tell us why we shouldn't consider the 
                                                             
17
 Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993: pp.57-58 
18 Ibid, p. 277. 
19 Torrance, pp. 512-515. 
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interests of computer programmes that develop their own goals or of the grand 
canyon, which could be said to have an interest in not being filled in (remember 
that in this account, having interests does not imply conscious interests). These 
results stray too far from our ordinary moral intuitions and should be seen as a 
reductio ad absurdum of the claim that sentience is not necessary for moral 
considerability.  Without the condition that the target of empathy be capable of 
conscious experience, the number of things that are morally considerable 
becomes too numerous, and renders the distinction between things that are 
rightly considered to be of moral concern, and those that are not, meaningless.20 
So, for a utilitarian, a machine must be sentient to be morally considerable. This is 
the first principle of utilitarian machine ethics: 
The Principle of Necessary Sentience: If a machine is not 
sentient, then it cannot be harmed. 
This principle aligns with how we currently categorise machines. 
If we could know that Andrew is not sentient, then he would know that 
Andrew was not capable of being harmed and so was not morally considerable. If 
Andrew is sentient however, and we could know that he was, then we would 
know that Andrew was morally considerable. This is because if a being is 
sentient, then this is not just a necessary condition, but also a sufficient condition 
for moral considerability. According to what Singer calls “the principle of equal 
consideration of interests”21, any sentient machine’s interest in avoiding 
                                                             
20 Thompson, Janna. “A refutation of environmental ethics.” Environmental Ethics 12 (2) 
(1990):147-160 
21
 Singer, Practical Ethics, p.21 
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(equivalent) suffering must not be regarded as any less important than that of 
any other such interest, including our own. The principle of equal consideration 
of interests is the principle that: “an interest is an interest, whoever's interest it 
may be”22, and it requires that equivalent interests (“in so far as a rough 
comparison can be made”23) be considered equally regardless of morally 
irrelevant considerations like race, gender, or species. Singer most notably used 
this principle to significant effect in Animal Liberation (1975), when he argued 
that most human beings were “speciesist”, a term comparable (both descriptively 
and morally) to “racist” or “sexist”24. In Singer's view, pain is intrinsically bad, and 
the reason why we should wish to prevent a specific being's pain is not because it 
is that particular being's pain, but simply because of “the undesirability of pain as 
such”25.  Singer claims that the reasoning of the racist or speciesist is flawed 
because it singles out for importance a category that is not a morally important 
category (race and species respectively). Once we recognise that pain is bad in 
and of itself, then any being in which it is found is an appropriate target for moral 
sympathy, whether or not it falls into the same racial or species category as 
ourselves. In Practical Ethics (2nd Edition), Singer writes: 
To give less consideration to a specified amount of pain because 
that pain was experienced by a member of a particular race 
would be to make an arbitrary distinction. Why pick on race? 
Why not on whether the person was born in a leap year? Or 
whether there is more than one vowel in her surname? All of 
                                                             
22
Singer, Practical Ethics, p.21 
23
Ibid., p.50 
24
Singer, Animal Liberation, p.9 
25
Singer, Practical Ethics, p.21 
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these characteristics are equally irrelevant to the undesirability 
of pain from the universal point of view.26 
If it cannot matter to “the undesirability of pain from the universal point of view” 
that a being is of a particular race or gender, then nor should it matter what 
material a being is made from, since the principle of equal consideration of 
interests requires that any interest in avoiding suffering, regardless of where that 
interest lies, be considered equally with any equivalent interest. And this result is 
of obvious significance for the moral considerability of machines. If a being can 
really suffer, then the fact that it is made of metal rather than flesh, or the fact 
that it was designed and manufactured rather than naturally conceived and born, 
should be of no consequence to an assessment of its moral worth. Those who 
think otherwise hold an unjustified prejudice, equivalent to racism or speciesism. 
The prejudice thus referred to is sometimes known as “substrate chauvinism”27, 
(defined as “the conviction that only biological matter can carry moral worth”28) 
or “substratism”29. The idea of a prejudice against robots was considered in 1964 
by Putnam, who wrote: ““discrimination” based on the “softness” or “hardness” of 
the body parts of a synthetic “organism” seems as silly as discriminatory 
                                                             
26 Ibid., p.22. 
27 See Virtual Worldlets Network, “VWN Virtual Dictionary: Substrate Chauvinism,” (n.d.), 
http://www.virtualworldlets.net/Resources/Dictionary.php?Term=Substrate%20Chauvinism&Letter=S, 
accessed 21/09/2010; and Dvorsky, George. “Sentient Developments: Must-know terms for the 
21st Century intellectual: Redux”, January 11, 2007. 
http://www.sentientdevelopments.com/2007/01/must-know-terms-for-21st-century_11.html,  accessed 
03/06/2010. 
28 Virtual Worldlets Network 
29
 Walker, Mark. “A Moral Paradox in the Creation of Artificial Intelligence: Mary Poppins 3000s of 
the World Unite!” in Human Implications of Human-Robot Interaction: Papers from the AAAI 
Workshop, edited by Ted Metzler, California: AAAI Press, 2006: p.3 
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treatment of humans on the basis of skin color.”30 This prejudice is not a problem 
now, since the synthetic beings we encounter today do not have any more 
sentience than a rock, but it is possible that in the future, substratism may indeed 
become harmful discrimination, if we build (or encounter) sentient beings made 
from inorganic material. 
It might be claimed that a prejudice against equal consideration for robots 
is not an irrational prejudice. An objection could be made that since only beings 
made of flesh can experience real pain, a prejudice against machines would be 
entirely justified. It is true that such a prejudice would not be irrational now, 
since we have good reasons to believe that no currently existing artificially-
created beings can feel pain; but this may not remain true forever (the extent to 
which we might suppose the connection between pain and flesh necessary will be 
considered in the next chapter). Moreover, a distinction must be made between 
making a judgement about the likely properties of a being, and a moral prejudice 
about the deserved treatment of a being. We don't think that rocks are sentient, 
so there is nothing irrational about a moral prejudice against the kind treatment 
of rocks. The principle of equal consideration of interests requires us to accept 
that if a being made of metal or plastic was found to be experiencing suffering 
equivalent to suffering that we ourselves can feel, then it would be an irrational 
prejudice to ignore this suffering purely because the being was inorganic. Now we 
have arrived at the second principle of utilitarian machine ethics: 
The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: If a machine 
is sentient, then its preferences or interests should be considered as 
                                                             
30 Putnam, p.691 
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important as the equivalent preferences or interests (“in so far as 
rough comparisons can be made”) of other sentient beings. 
For a utilitarian, since sentience is both necessary and sufficient for moral 
considerability, the question “Can a machine be morally considerable?” can be 
replaced with the question: “Can a machine be sentient?” The next chapter will 
consider the problem of how we could tell whether a machine is sentient, but 
first, we must know what it is that we are looking for. What is “sentience”? Singer 
uses the term “sentience” as: “shorthand for the capacity to suffer or experience 
enjoyment or happiness”31. But in this thesis, it will be beneficial to unpack the 
term a little more; although sentience is relatively easy to spot in the natural 
world, it will prove harder to locate in the artificial world, as the discussion in the 
next chapter demonstrates. An analysis of the term will help us to understand 
what we mean when we say that sentience is both necessary and sufficient for 
moral considerability. 
Sentience suggests two components, each of which are necessary to really 
be considered the type of sentience that warrants moral considerability. A 
sentient being is both phenomenally conscious and has qualitatively good or bad 
experiences (usually understood as pleasure and pain). A being that was able to 
have conscious experiences, but that had no preferences about its conscious 
states, could not be morally significant. Nor could a being that had such 
preferences, but no conscious experience. It will be necessary to say more about 
                                                             
31 Singer, Practical Ethics, p.58. 
[19] 
 
each of these components and to say why they are each important for the moral 
significance of sentience. 
CONSCIOUSNESS  
It should be clear that conscious experience is a vital part of sentience. In 
The Emperor's New Mind, Roger Penrose asks us to consider a machine that 
receives ratings from its programmer for things that it does (For example, 
running out of electricity might be rated “-1”, but spending time in the company 
of other machines might be rated “+1”). It avoids the things with negative ratings, 
and seeks out the things with positive ratings, trying to increase what Penrose 
calls its “pleasure-pain score”32. Despite the fact that the behaviour of the 
machine would resemble that of some animals, this machine would not be 
sentient. Mere “avoidance behaviour” is not the same as being in pain. For that, a 
conscious experience of the sensation of pain is required. 
Despite the apparent difficulties in securing an agreed upon definition 
during years of philosophical discussions about consciousness, it is clear that 
some definitions are far superior to others. In particular any definition that does 
not take into account the experiential elements of consciousness does not seem to 
be talking about consciousness at all, since what seems to be so unique about 
consciousness (one might even say that it is literally its defining feature) is the 
experience of qualia. One of the best descriptions of consciousness comes from 
David Chalmers, who writes: 
                                                             
32 Penrose, Roger. The Emperor's New Mind : Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics. 
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989: pp. 17-21. 
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When we perceive, think, and act, there is a whir of causation 
and information processing, but this processing does not usually 
go on in the dark. There is also an internal aspect; there is 
something that it feels like to be a cognitive agent. This internal 
aspect is conscious experience. Conscious experience ranges 
from vivid color sensations to experiences of the faintest 
background aromas; from hard-edged pains to the elusive 
experience of thoughts on the tip of one's tongue; from mundane 
sounds and smells to the encompassing grandeur of musical 
experience; from the triviality of a nagging itch to the weight of a 
deep existential angst; from the specificity of the taste of 
peppermint to the generality of one's experience of selfhood. All 
of these have a distinct experienced quality.33 
As Chalmers admits, central to this description is Thomas Nagel's definition of a 
conscious being. In “What is it Like to be a Bat?” Nagel writes that: “An organism 
has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be 
that organism – something that it is like for the organism.”34 [italics in original]. 
This definition captures the primacy of the experience of consciousness. In the 
following discussion, when the term “consciousness” is used, it is Nagel's 
definition of consciousness, and Chalmers' description of qualia, that the reader 
should keep in mind. 
It is of special significance to any moral discussion about machines that we 
establish not only what is meant by “consciousness”, but also what is not meant. 
                                                             
33 Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York : Oxford 
University Press, 1996: p. 4. 
34 Nagel, T. “What is it like to be a bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): p. 436. 
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In particular, it is vital to separate the two concepts of “thinking” and 
“consciousness”, or what Chalmers calls the “psychological” aspects of mind and 
the “phenomenal” aspects of mind35. As Jack Copeland has noted, when talking 
about machine intelligence, the separation of these two concepts can have “a 
liberating effect on the discussion”36. This is especially true since computers are 
able to perform many tasks that resemble human thought, but that presumably 
don't have the phenomenal content that sometimes accompany their equivalents 
in human beings. The human brain also accomplishes many things unconsciously 
that can properly be described as “thought”. To use a well-worn example, we may 
drive down the street while preoccupied, all the while avoiding obstacles and 
changing gears37. Here, our conscious mind is focussed on something else, and we 
find that our brain has nevertheless allowed us to navigate through traffic safely. 
Thought processes without any conscious content can indeed be quite 
remarkable: in the case of “blindsight”, an affected patient may accurately locate a 
spot of light on a board by pointing to it, even while they have no conscious 
experience of being able to see the light, and will claim that they are merely 
guessing at its location38. The mind is able to perceive the light, locate its position, 
and direct the hand exactly how to point to it, using only unconscious mental 
processes, while the conscious mind has no awareness of the thinking that the 
brain is engaged in. If such processes can be properly described as “thought” (and 
if it is not “thought”, then what is it?), then from examples such as these, we can 
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see that “thinking” and “consciousness”, though often related, are indeed distinct 
concepts39. If thinking and consciousness are conceptually separate, then we can 
describe what a machine is doing as “thinking”, without thereby implying 
anything about its possession of phenomenally conscious states. As a 
consequence, we can then say that machines can think, or that they have mental 
or psychological states, without making any commitment about their moral 
status. 
This distinction can also help to clarify some issues related to the 
ontological status of consciousness. Putnam claimed that the issue of whether or 
not a robot was conscious was purely a matter of choice; he argued that the 
solution to the problem was more a decision about which words to use, than a 
discovery to be made40. But if we take a Nagelian view of consciousness, then this 
doesn't seem to be right. If there is something that it is like to be a being, then no 
amount of decision-making about words can change that fact. As John Searle puts 
it, “my present state of consciousness is entirely observer-independent, No 
matter what anyone thinks, I am now conscious.”41. On the other hand, whether 
or not a being is “thinking” or “understanding” is a decision that needs to be made 
about which words are appropriate to use to describe the behaviour (if 
“behaviour” is the right word to use) of a machine, when it does things that 
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appear similar to what a human does, when (s)he thinks or understands42. The 
difference between the case of thinking and consciousness is that to claim that a 
computer is thinking postulates nothing occurring aside from what we can 
observe43. We know that when we push buttons on a calculator to add two digits, 
the states of flip-flops inside the calculator's processing chip lead eventually to 
the calculator's display screen illuminating in certain parts, and as observers, we 
interpret those illuminated parts as numbers, and the whole process as 
“calculating”. To use Searle's terminology, the calculator's “calculating” is 
“observer-dependent” or “observer-relational”44. Without an observer to 
interpret the calculator's states as the adding of two numbers, the sequence of 
states that occur inside the calculator could mean anything (or more precisely, 
without an observer to interpret them, they can mean nothing). On the other 
hand, when we say that a being is conscious, we are postulating something extra 
above what we can view, namely the existence of observer-independent (but 
ontologically subjective45) experiences. Since thinking is not equivalent to 
consciousness, then the question of whether a machine can think is of little moral 
interest to us. Unconscious thought processes are not proper objects of moral 
empathy, since we literally cannot imagine what it is like to be having an 
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unconscious mental state; it is not like anything46. To summarise the discussion 
thus far: 
1) A being is morally considerable iff that being is sentient. 
2) If a being is sentient, then it is conscious. 
3) A being is conscious iff there is something that it is like to be 
that being. 
MORALLY SIGNIFICANT CONSCIOUS STATES 
It is not just experiences of any sort of qualia that qualify a being for moral 
considerability. A being must be capable of having qualitatively good or bad 
experiences. A being must have these specific types of conscious states, since 
without them, moral sympathy would again be inappropriate. We cannot make 
sense of what it could mean to harm a being that was totally indifferent to all its 
conscious states(it is unlikely that such a being exists in nature, but it seems 
conceptually possible in the case of artificial beings). Suppose that, in the early 
stages of trying to create a fully-functional sentient android, scientists create a 
being that has some very basic conscious states, but has no good or bad conscious 
states. Suppose that this robot is conscious only insofar as it is able to see colours, 
but it can have qualitatively rich experiences of them. Apart from this colour 
perception and experience, the robot has no other conscious thought. Call this 
robot RAINBOW 1. It makes no difference to RAINBOW 1 whether it is in a blue 
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room or a red room. Although it can experience the colour, it feels indifferent to 
which colour it is shown. There is something that it is like to be RAINBOW 1 
seeing the colour red that is similar to the way it is for you to see the colour red. 
But RAINBOW 1 doesn't feel good or bad about red. It just sees it. Because of the 
lack of qualitatively good or bad experiences, it seems that it is impossible to 
morally harm RAINBOW 1 in any way. Would switching off or destroying 
RAINBOW 1 count as morally harming it? That is, all other things being equal, 
wouldn't it be better for RAINBOW 1 to experience colour than not?  It seems that 
it cannot matter to RAINBOW 1, since RAINBOW 1 is indifferent about all colour 
experiences. It doesn't feel pleasure or pain associated with the experience, and it 
feels no more excitement about a bright colour experience than a dark one. If 
RAINBOW 1 were placed in room that become successively darker, there would 
be no point (even when it became pitch black) at which it would begin to feel 
discomfort. So it seems that switching off RAINBOW 1 wouldn't really matter to it. 
Although we may be able to empathise with RAINBOW 1, in the sense that we can 
imagine (to some extent) what it is like for it to see red, we cannot sympathise 
with RAINBOW 1 because, having no good or bad experiences, it is not an 
appropriate object for moral sympathy. Now suppose that the scientists develop a 
second robot: RAINBOW 2. RAINBOW 2 is just like RAINBOW 1 except that when 
it sees the colour red, it experiences this as a qualitatively bad experience, and 
when it sees blue, it has a qualitatively good experience. In this scenario, it seems 
that it would be possible to harm the robot by placing it in a red room, and to be 
kind to the robot by placing it in a blue one. The addition of good or bad conscious 
states has made the robot morally considerable. For an artificial being to be 
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morally considerable, it is not enough that it is merely conscious. We must also be 
able to say of its experiences that they are good or bad. 
The results of the enquiries undertaken thus far indicate that if our crew 
member, Andrew, has phenomenally conscious experiences that are qualitatively 
good or bad, then he is morally considerable. Yet this hardly ends our dilemma , 
for even if Andrew does claim to have these experiences, how can we be sure that 
he really does have them? Does a machine's behaviour provide a reliable 
indicator as to its internal states? We need to know whether or not it is even 
possible for a machine like Andrew to have conscious experiences. The question 
“Can a machine be sentient?” can now be replaced with the question: “Can a 
machine have phenomenally conscious experiences that are qualitatively good or 
bad?”  This is the question that is considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: ON WHETHER A MACHINE 
COULD SATISFY CONDITIONS FOR 
MORAL CONSIDERABILITY 
“Every cognition involves a contribution of the observer. The sensory input 
provides some constraints, but the perceiver automatically corrects for any 
deficiencies in the data by interpreting the inputs in terms of strong assumptions 
and expectations. Under ordinary and familiar circumstances these unconscious 
inferences serve as veridical guides as to what is actually the case. But under 
special conditions they can badly lead us astray.” 
–Ray Hyman- The Psychology of Deception47 
In the previous chapter, the question:“Can a machine be morally 
considerable?” was found to be equivalent to the question: “Can a machine have 
phenomenally conscious states that are qualitatively good or bad?” The goal of 
this chapter will be to try to provide an answer to this second question (and by 
logical necessity, the first). This question invokes two major problems in 
philosophy: first, a problem of metaphysics, encompassing what is commonly 
known as the Mind/Body Problem; and second, an epistemological problem, The 
Problem of Other Minds. I will call these, “The General Metaphysical Problem of 
Minds”, and “The General Epistemological Problem of Other Minds”, respectively. 
In their specifically machine-related incarnations, I will call them, “The 
Metaphysical Problem of Machine Minds”, and “The Epistemological Problem of 
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Machine Minds”, respectively. Note that, for reasons explained in the previous 
chapter, as it is used here, the word “mind” refers only to the type of mental state 
that is of most interest to ethicists: phenomenally conscious states that are 
qualitatively good or bad: 
General Problems of Mind: 
1) The General Metaphysical Problem of Minds: “What kinds of 
things can have minds?” 
2) The General Epistemological Problem of Other Minds: “How 
can we know if a thing has a mind?” 
Machine-related Problems of Mind: 
1) The Metaphysical Problem of Machine Minds: “Are machines 
the kinds of things that can have minds?” 
2) The Epistemological Problem of Machine Minds: “How would 
we know if a machine had a mind?” 
The Metaphysical Problems and the Epistemological Problems are closely related; 
one of the ways we might resolve one of the Metaphysical Problems is by trying 
to find a solution to the relevant Epistemological Problem (and vice versa). The 
difficulty we have in resolving a Metaphysical Problem is partly due to the 
difficulty we have in finding a solution to related Epistemological Problem (and 
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vice versa). In this chapter I will address both the Metaphysical Problem and the 
Epistemological Problem as they relate to machines. 
THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF MACHINE MINDS: “ARE MACHINES 
THE KINDS  OF THINGS CAN HAVE MINDS?” 
The only thing that is known to create consciousness is a brain, but it is not 
known exactly how this is done. The functionalist view of the mind holds that 
consciousness is the result of a particular method of processing information, and 
thus, it can be replicated in any substrate that allows the required method of 
information-processing to occur, while a related theory of mind, 
computationalism, is the theory that the mind is just a digital computer. 
According to both functionalists and computationalists, there is no reason why a 
machine could not have conscious states. The application of functionalism and 
computationalism to the creation of machine minds has led to the development of 
the field of Artificial Intelligence. It is popularly supposed that beings with 
computers for minds will be the first artificially intelligent beings, and this may be 
so. But if the distinction between thinking and consciousness is sound, then there 
is less reason to suppose that computer-based beings will be the first artificially 
conscious beings. Of all the properties of the human brain, why should its 
information-processing capabilities be the property that leads to consciousness? 
It might be supposed that this is so because beings that have greater or more 
complex information-processing capabilities also have greater, deeper, or more 
qualitatively rich conscious experiences; but it is impossible to argue this without 
begging the question. We don't know that the experiences of those with more 
complex brains have any more of a phenomenal quality that the experiences of 
those beings with less complex brains. And even if we did, we wouldn't know 
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whether information-processing capabilities were sufficient for consciousness, or 
were merely necessary, with consciousness requiring a particular sort of 
information-processing within a particular sort of material (organic brain 
matter). 
Biological naturalism is the view that the brain produces consciousness 
because it is made of the appropriate material to make consciousness, rather than 
because of the way it manipulates information. John Searle is a biological 
naturalist, and he claims that consciousness is a biological phenomenon, like 
lactation or photosynthesis, and like those phenomena, it occurs only in certain 
types of material48. A functionalist or computationalist mind could theoretically 
be created by any material, but biological naturalism holds that, unless this mind 
is instantiated in a particular substrate, then it is unlikely that there will be 
anything that it is like to be that mind. Searle claims that any complex behaviour 
that results from computation occurring in a substrate that doesn’t have the 
necessary biological properties would be merely a simulation of human or animal 
behaviour, and would not be accompanied by intentionality, understanding, or 
consciousness. He writes:  “It is just as ridiculous to think that a system that had a 
simulation of consciousness and other mental processes thereby had the mental 
processes as it would be to think that the simulation of digestion on a computer 
could thereby actually digest beer and pizza”49. 
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Ned Block claims that Searle’s argument “depends on ungrounded 
empirical speculation”50, because Searle asserts that only brain matter (or an 
artificial substitute that was able to accurately synthesise the appropriate 
physical-chemical properties of brain matter) can create consciousness. But 
aren’t Searle’s opponents also guilty of speculation when they claim that certain 
information-processing tasks and their resulting behaviours are indicators of 
conscious experience? Since we currently have limited understanding of 
consciousness, anyone engaged in the task of synthesising machine consciousness 
will need to make some sort of prediction about how that result is most likely to 
be achieved. Searle’s speculation that it is more likely to be achieved through 
replication of the brain’s biological properties is no more ungrounded than the 
speculation of those who believe it is more likely to be achieved through 
replication of the brain’s information-processing capabilities. 
Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment is the most famous criticism of 
the claim that computational processes will lead to conscious experience51. Since 
the thought experiment will be familiar to many readers, a brief description 
should suffice: The Chinese Room involves an agent in a room who is given pieces 
of paper through a hole in the door, upon which are written various squiggles. 
Using a rulebook that contains nothing but formal rules (of the type “If you see 
“squiggle squiggle”, respond with “squoggle squoggle”52), the agent writes 
“responses” to the input he has been given and passes them back out the door. 
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Unbeknownst to him, the “squiggles” and “squoggles” are actually Chinese 
characters, being passed to him by native Chinese speakers. The point of Searle’s 
thought experiment is this: even if the agent becomes so good at following his 
rulebook that native Chinese speakers outside the room believe that they are 
speaking to another native Chinese speaker, the agent inside the room will never 
really understand Chinese. By analogy, other symbol-manipulators that simply 
follow formal rules, like modern computers, don’t really understand the 
information that they process either, regardless of adept at it they become. 
Searle sometimes writes that the Chinese Room argument is intended to 
show that the system he describes (and thus, similar systems like today’s desktop 
computers) has no “understanding”53, or sometimes that it has no 
“intentionality”54, but the thought experiment is equally effective as part of an 
argument demonstrating that computational systems need not have 
“consciousness”, or at least the type of phenomenally-conscious states we are 
interested in. David Chalmers agrees. He writes that, despite Searle’s use of 
multiple terms, “it is clear that consciousness is at the root of the matter.”55 
The Chinese Room has been the target of much criticism since it was first 
described in 1980. Many of these critiques point out that the thought experiment 
doesn’t translate well into a valid argument. For example, Copeland notes that the 
argument appears to make an invalid inference from the conclusion that the 
agent in the room doesn’t understand Chinese to the conclusion that the whole 
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system doesn’t understand Chinese56. A similar point is made by Block, who 
claims that the whole Chinese Room system does in fact “think”, even though the 
agent inside the room isn’t conscious of it57. These replies are representative of 
the most successful criticisms of Searle’ argument: they are variants of the 
“Systems Reply”. The Systems Reply is a response to Searle’s argument which 
claims that, even if the agent inside the Chinese Room does not understand 
Chinese, the whole system (consisting of agent, room, and rulebook) does. 
Copeland and Block argue that, if the Chinese Room Argument is supposed to 
show that a system like the Chinese Room does not think, or understand Chinese, 
then it fails, for as we have seen, the usage of the word think and understand do 
not suggest the existence of any observer-independent phenomena. If English-
language speakers decide to use these words to describe what the Chinese Room 
is doing, then Searle’s claim that the Chinese Room does not understand is simply 
false. 
But if we recall that “consciousness is at the root of the matter”, and recall 
that the type of consciousness we are interested in are phenomenal states, then 
the Systems Reply is on much shakier ground, for the claim now becomes one 
about the existence of an observer-independent phenomenon: subjective 
experience. Would successful communication with native Chinese speakers (to 
the point that those outside the room believed that they were speaking to another 
native Chinese speaker) by a system involving a room, an agent following formal 
rules, a book, and some pieces of paper, result in the creation of phenomenal 
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experiences for that system? Although we cannot prove that it doesn’t, it certainly 
seems very unlikely. 
Block concedes that, although he believes that the Chinese Room system 
“thinks”, there probably isn’t anything that it is like to be the Chinese Room58. And 
Block also suggests a similar thought experiment: the Chinese Nation. In this 
experiment, Block imagines a body being controlled by the population of China, 
using radio communication to simulate the communication that takes place 
between neurons. Again, Block concludes that, although the Chinese Nation could 
conceivably control a body that behaved like a human, it is not likely that it would 
experience qualia59. 
Searle and Block rely on our intuitions that rooms and groups of people 
linked by radios are not the type of things that would have phenomenal 
consciousness. But it has been argued that human brains are themselves unlikely 
candidates for consciousness; isn’t it rather surprising to find consciousness in a 
lump of meat? This might seem just as odd as the idea that a room could have a 
subjective experience, yet we do find consciousness in meat, in our own brains. 
Perhaps (the objection goes) our intuitions about consciousness in rooms and 
people linked by radios are just as flawed as the intuitions we have about 
consciousness in meat. In response, Searle points out the peculiarity of the claim 
that it should be surprising to find consciousness in a lump of grey flesh. After all, 
he notes, isn’t that the only place that we know of that does have consciousness? 
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Why then would this be at all surprising?60 Block also points out that there is a 
difference between our intuitions that brains shouldn’t have qualia, and our 
intuitions that Chinese Room or Chinese Nation-type beings (or “homunculi-
heads”, as Block calls them61), probably don’t. Given the evidence of our own 
subjective experience, and our understanding of medical science, we have reason 
to doubt our intuition that brains seem unlikely seats of consciousness. On the 
other hand, we have no reason to doubt the intuition that “homunculi-heads” 
don’t. A rational person would accept the evidence that brains can be conscious, 
but can remain sceptical that inorganic information-processing systems can.   
Computational and functionalist theories of mind provide an explanation 
of the difference between a thinking and non-thinking thing, but not of the 
difference between a conscious and a non-conscious being. Without being able to 
make this distinction, we cannot know whether machines have the properties 
that would make them morally valuable. Machines whose minds duplicate only 
the functional properties of brains may have all the information-processing 
properties of a human, but they may lack subjective phenomenal consciousness. 
It is possible that a machine could be the kind of thing that has a mind, but with a 
limited understanding of consciousness, we cannot be sure. 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF MACHINE MINDS: “HOW WOULD 
WE KNOW IF A MACHINE HAD A MIND?”  
Suppose that it was the brain’s information-processing properties that 
lead to consciousness, how would we know if the information-processing 
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methods that we use in our computing machines are the right ones? Our 
computers might achieve the appropriate result outwardly, but since much of 
information-processing that occurs within our own brains occurs without 
consciousness, how would we know which of a machine’s information-processing 
was occurring with accompanying subjective experience, and which was not? 
How would we know if any of it was? 
As we have seen, the subjective viewpoint is of special significance to 
ethics, so it is important that we are able to verify the presence of this special 
point-of-view in any agent we might encounter. Moreover, it is vital that we are 
able to verify the presence of subjectivity scientifically, or from a third-person 
perspective. Yet, as Nagel points out, subjective experience is irreducibly 
subjective; any attempt to describe consciousness from a third-person 
perspective will inevitably sacrifice the first-person perspective, thereby 
abandoning exactly what it is that makes consciousness unique: its subjective 
viewpoint62. If subjective experience cannot be verified scientifically, we will find 
it impossible to ever be sure about whether or not consciousness is present, even 
in fellow human beings. The problem, which I will label The Epistemological 
Problem of Other Human Minds, is summed up by Alan Turing as follows: 
A is liable to believe ‘A thinks but B does not’ whilst B believes ‘B 
thinks but A does not’. Instead of arguing continually over this 
                                                             
62 Nagel, p. 437. 
[37] 
 
point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone 
thinks.63 
Given the explanatory gap between objective phenomena and subjective 
consciousness, the problem is perhaps insurmountable, yet it is almost always 
ignored in daily life, perhaps for the sake of “polite convention”. In truth, no 
conscious being can know with definite certainty whether any other being is 
conscious. The only thing that they can do is infer that others are conscious from 
the fact that others behave or look similar to them. This is an inference known as 
the “argument by analogy”. Bertrand Russell describes the argument by analogy 
as follows: 
If, whenever we can observe whether A and B are present or 
absent, we find that every case of B has an A as a causal 
antecedent, then it is probable that most B's have A's as causal 
antecedents, even in cases where observation does not enable us 
to know whether A is present or not.64 
So, if A is a conscious mental state of feeling thirsty, and B is the act of saying “I 
am thirsty”, then the argument by analogy tells us: 
In situations in which I can observe whether or not A and B are 
present (my own subjective experience): 
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1) The action of saying “I am thirsty” (B) only occurs when there 
also exists a mental state with the conscious content of feeling 
thirsty (A). 
Therefore, it is highly probable that: 
2) Most situations that consist of saying “I am thirsty” (B), occur 
when there also exists a mental state with the conscious 
content of feeling thirsty (A). 
Even in situations where we are unable to verify the presence of 
both A and B (observing the behaviour of others). 
The argument by analogy thus suggests that we have good reason to suppose that 
other humans have the same or similar mental states to ourselves. 
Can we use the argument by analogy to solve the Epistemological Problem 
of Machine Minds? Some commentators think so65. They claim that the Problem 
of Machine Minds involves many issues that are also evident in our own daily 
interactions with other humans. They therefore argue that, since these issues are 
not overly significant obstacles for attributing consciousness to humans, they 
ought not to stop anyone from attributing consciousness to a machine. Since we 
are so good at ignoring the problem when communicating with our fellow 
humans, why can we not do the same (the claim goes) when communicating with 
                                                             
65
 Those who make this claim include: Penrose, Harnad, S. “The Turing Test is not a trick: Turing 
indistinguishability is a scientific criterion,” ACM SIGART Bulletin 3, no. 4 (1992): 9–10., and Leiber, 
Justin, Can Animals and Machines be Persons?: a Dialogue, Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 
1985 
[39] 
 
robots? After all, I don’t doubt that when Adam says he has a headache, he really 
has one. So why should I doubt it when Andrew says he has a headache? As 
Stevan Harnad points out, when communicating with a pen-pal, we don’t need to 
examine the pen-pal physically to infer that they have a mind. To ask for more 
proof for the existence of conscious states from a machine is “arbitrary”66. 
Yet these critics are fundamentally mistaken. There are significant 
differences between The Epistemological Problem of Other Human Minds and 
The Epistemological Problem of Machine Minds. The argument from analogy 
allows us to infer that other humans have minds, but the further away from a 
human brain we move, the less the analogy holds. We find as we move a relatively 
small step away from humans to the question of whether non-human animals are 
conscious (what might be described as the Epistemological Problem of Animal 
Minds), it is taken for granted that animals are conscious almost as often as it is 
that humans are. But sometimes, even the consciousness of non-human animals is 
doubted. Singer addresses the Epistemological Problem of Animal Minds in 
Animal Liberation, in which he expounds a view that those animals that are 
further down the evolutionary ladder, and thus holding fewer properties in 
common with humans, are less likely to be conscious67. Singer responds to those 
who express scepticism about the idea that animals can feel pain by giving 3 
reasons to infer that animals have similar experiences of pain to our own. He 
points out that animals share with humans: 
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1) Similar behaviour: Many animals express many of the same or 
similar types of pain behaviour that we have when we are in 
pain (for example, crying out, moving away from the negative 
stimulus). 
2) Physical similarity: Many animals possess nervous systems 
that are physically similar to those possessed by human beings. 
3) An evolutionary link: Since animals share a common 
evolutionary origin with us, it is rational to suppose that their 
similar biology functions the same way as ours. Pain avoidance 
is also evolutionary advantageous, so we should expect it to be 
common in higher animals like mammals.68 
With these arguments, Singer provides an argument by analogy that answers the 
Epistemological Problem of Animal Minds, but it is equally applicable to the 
Epistemological Problem of Other Human Minds. We think that other humans and 
animals have minds, not only because they behave like us, but also because they 
look like us. From the fact that you look like me, I can infer that you share the 
similar underlying physical systems, including a nervous system. Importantly, I 
also infer that we are both the products of millions of years of evolution. In terms 
of mental states, I conclude from the former inferences that what goes on inside 
our heads should be expected to serve the same evolutionary function (whatever 
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that function might be), so it is likely to be similar. Singer writes of other animals 
that: 
It is surely unreasonable to suppose that nervous systems that 
are virtually identical physiologically, have a common origin and 
a common evolutionary function, and result in similar forms of 
behaviour in similar circumstances should actually operate in an 
entirely different manner on the level of subjective feelings.69 
But the same analogy cannot be made with machines. Even if robots are made to 
be behaviourally or outwardly physically indistinguishable from humans it would 
not be reasonable to assume that a being that acts or looks the same as oneself is 
“virtually identical physiologically” under the skin, or that it has “a common 
origin” and “common evolutionary function[s]”. And this means that, unlike in the 
case of other animals, or other humans, it would not be “unreasonable” to 
suppose that its mind operated “in an entirely different manner on the level of 
subjective feelings”. The analogy between humans and machines is less strong 
than the analogy between my own case and that of other humans, or even that of 
my own case and that of other animals, and as a result, the argument by analogy 
for the presence of machine minds is significantly weaker. 
By way of comparison, consider each of the reasons that Singer provided 
as reasons to infer that animals have minds, as they apply to machines. In each of 
these cases it will be clear that the argument by analogy provides a much weaker 
reason for inferring the presence of consciousness in machines than it does in the 
case of other humans or animals. 
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SIMILAR BEHAVIOUR 
Machines may indeed have similar behaviour to humans, but unlike in the 
cases of humans or animals, this behaviour may not be a clue to subjective 
experiences in their minds. If the machine is developed using a “top-down” 
method of design, then it will be designed with a specific behaviour in mind. The 
actual method used to create that behaviour need not coincide with that used to 
create similar behaviour that appears in humans or animals. The problem with all 
behavioural evidence for consciousness is that is seems possible to imagine a 
being that outwardly presents behaviour that is indistinguishable from conscious 
human behaviour, but that has no conscious states (the philosophical zombie). 
There is no way to tell whether or not a being that had passed a behavioural test 
was in fact just a variety of robot zombie, or whether it had really experienced 
phenomenal consciousness. It certainly seems plausible that an artificial being 
that evolves a tendency to avoid harmful situations, for example, could still lack 
the pain experiences that we might expect to find in natural beings displaying 
such behaviour. Although our own evolution resulted in the development of 
qualitatively bad pain experiences alongside the pain behaviour, there is no 
certainty that this was necessarily so, since it doesn’t seem to be pain feelings that 
are evolutionarily advantageous, but pain-avoidance behaviour70. In his 
description of the argument by analogy, Russell writes that the argument by 
analogy does not allow us to conclude that it is definitely the case that B is always 
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caused by A, but only that it is “highly probable” that B is always caused by A71. It 
is a fallacy of reasoning to make the inference that just because A and B always 
occur together that they must necessarily always occur together. In particular, the 
argument by analogy does not allow us to come to the conclusion that things that 
are true of natural entities are also true of artificial ones. For example, a person 
living before the 18th century might have felt justified in making the following 
claim: 
In situations in which I can observe whether or not A and B are 
present: 
1) It is true that an entity flies (B) only when that entity 
has wings (A). 
Therefore, it is highly probable that: 
2) Any entity that flies (B) has wings (A). 
But the existence of hot air balloons and helicopters demonstrate that wings are 
not necessary for flight. In the 21st century we note that there are many times in 
which B is present, but A is not. Similarly, we sometimes see claims made by 
roboticists to the effect that: 
In situations in which I can observe whether or not A and B are 
present: 
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1) If a naturally-occuring entity has the (outwardly visible) 
properties of a person (use of language, reasoning, 
thinking, planning for the future, etc.) (B), I can infer the 
presence of consciousness (A). 
Therefore, it is highly probable that: 
2) For any entity that has the (outwardly visible) properties of 
a person (use of language, reasoning, thinking, planning for 
the future, etc.)(B), I can infer that they must also be 
conscious (A). 
In his entertaining article “"If Droids Could Think..." Droids as Slaves and 
Persons”, Robert Arp makes a claim of this sort, implying that we can infer that 
the droids in Star Wars can feel fear because they behave as if they do72. This is a 
prime example of use of the argument by analogy to draw an erroneous 
conclusion; “fear behaviour” usually indicates the presence of fear in natural 
animals, but not necessarily in artificial ones. These inferences are not reasonable 
to make for artificial creations because, as Joanna Bryson and Phil Kime note, 
“aspects of cognition do not automatically come with others”.  We have developed 
phenomenal consciousness alongside behavioural properties such as the ability 
to use language, but “our particular mix is the product of millions of years of 
evolution.”73. It is possible that, through our own attempts at artificial evolution, 
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we might create a being with most of the outward properties of a person, but 
without it having any conscious awareness. 
Consider one prominent example of a behavioural test for consciousness: 
Alan Turing’s Imitation Game (more commonly known as “the Turing Test). In 
describing the test, Turing intended to provide a replacement for the question 
"Can machines think?", a question which he thought "too meaningless to deserve 
discussion"74. Turing seemed to think that the decision about whether a computer 
could be said to "think" was a linguistic decision, and that answering the question 
told us nothing interesting about the machine in question. Instead, Turing 
proposed an imitation game and a corresponding question, "Are there imaginable 
digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?"75. I have already 
argued that the question "can machines think?" is a relatively trivial one (perhaps 
there already exist some machines that can properly be described as “thinking” 
machines, but there is nothing morally significant about this); the most important 
test for ethicists is one that answers the question of whether or not the machine 
has conscious states. Note that it is not clear whether Turing himself wanted to 
know whether a machine had conscious states (in fact, it is likely that this was not 
the original aim of the test76), nevertheless, the Turing Test provides a convenient 
example of some of the problems of behavioural tests for consciousness. 
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In the Imitation Game, an interrogator sitting at a computer terminal 
receives responses to questions posed to both a person and a computer, located 
out of sight of the interrogator. The interrogator tries to ascertain which 
responses are coming from a person, and which are coming from a computer. The 
computer “passes the Turing test”, when the interrogator mistakes the 
computer’s responses for those of a person. Turing developed the Imitation Game 
because he thought that it would be difficult to convince people that computers 
could think. The test was designed to overcome what Turing supposed would be a 
natural bias against attributing minds to machines. But Turing did not have any 
evidence for his supposition; he really had no idea how people might react to a 
talking computer, because nobody had ever seen one. Is it possible that most 
people will be too willing to ascribe agency, the presence of a mind, or 
phenomenal consciousness to computers and other machines? In fact, humans do 
have a natural tendency to anthropomorphisise, a trait that probably arose due to 
its evolutionary advantage. Human beings are said to have a “Hyperactive Agency 
Detection Device” (or HADD), making them over-sensitive to the presence of 
intentional agents, particularly when faced with an unfamiliar or uncertain 
situation77. Triggering of the HADD is usually caused by an object moving or 
behaving in a way that is not expected by our intuitive understanding of the way 
such objects are supposed to behave, and this is true regardless of whether or not 
the object looks like a typical agent78. This suggests that Turing was wrong to 
suppose that people would struggle to see mechanised entities as agents with 
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intentional states; in fact, it suggests that people might be too eager to do so. 
Interpretations of the world that involve the presence of agency were probably 
selected for during human evolution because they can reveal the presence of 
enemies, mates, or food. It seems that it was better for the survival of early 
humans to over-attribute agency and risk wasting time searching for a predator 
or prey that did not exist rather than to under-attribute it, and miss out on a 
potential meal, or risk being killed by an enemy that they did not see. 
 Given the existence of the HADD in humans, we ought to be sceptical of 
positive Turing Test results, or positive results of any behavioural test for 
machine consciousness. If human beings have a tendency to ascribe 
consciousness where none exists, we should be surprised if there were not more 
than a few false positives in a behavioural test for phenomenal consciousness. 
While Turing was right to design a test that avoided natural human biases, he 
may have been misguided about which directions our natural bias would lead us; 
the Turing Test, and other behaviourally-based tests for consciousness, rather 
than discouraging bias, allow the natural tendencies of the HADD towards 
attributing intentionality to flourish. Moreover, because our minds have evolved 
in an environment in which all things that have behaved consistently in a human-
like way have in fact been other humans, we naturally ascribe human agency to 
things with behaviours typically only seen in humans (for example,  language, or 
the use of moral concepts). Once we have developed the ability to simulate these 
behaviours in artificial creations, this previously useful mental tool could become 
a liability. 
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What a computer that successfully passed the Turing Test could 
demonstrate is that it is possible for an entity to display patterns of “conscious 
behaviour” (the kind of behaviour that is usually accompanied by, or created by 
consciousness), using a method (in this case, “the rigorous execution of 
algorithms” 79) entirely different from that normally used by human beings to 
create the same behaviour. Indeed, as Halpern has pointed out, the Turing Test is 
perhaps best viewed not as a test to differentiate between a human and a 
machine, but rather as a test to differentiate between the use of natural thought 
processes and the use of systematic algorithms80. Even if the cognitive procedure 
normally used by human beings for a particular type of behavioural output 
always involves consciousness, there is no reason to suppose that the method 
used by a machine that duplicates this behaviour does. 
The Turing Test was developed to test computational devices in particular 
for human-like behaviour, but the same criticisms can be directed at any test that 
relies solely on behavioural output, regardless of what kind of device it is testing. 
Indeed, this is precisely the point: the results that we see could plausibly be the 
result of any method, including any that are not the same as those which are used 
by the human brain, and may or may not coincide with the existence of a 
subjective consciousness. Throughout most of human evolution, behavioural cues 
have been reliable indicators of morally relevant properties such as self-
awareness, sentience, and consciousness. In the age of androids this may no 
longer be the case.   
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PHYSICAL SIMILARITY 
 Since we can only be certain of the consciousness in our own brains, the 
less physically similar a being's brain is to a human brain, the less likely it is that 
it will have subjective conscious. Animals that have brains vastly different from 
our own, such as invertebrates, are typically considered less likely to be 
conscious, and we are most confident in inferring the presence of consciousness 
in higher mammals with brains relatively similar to our own. The exact degree of 
physical similarity between humans and future robots is impossible to predict, 
but given the fact that the same behaviours could come from different 
mechanisms, there could be a large degree of variance (as there is currently 
between the physical mechanisms of flying animals and those of flying machines 
like aeroplanes, for example). The greater the degree of variance between 
artificial brains and our own brains, the less successful any appeal to the 
argument by analogy will be. 
 It is also worth noting that there will be no way of knowing whether any 
given artificial brain has adequately duplicated the right parts of the brain to give 
rise to consciousness. Even the duplication of the neural structure of a natural 
brain in an artificial brain is no guarantee that the artificial brain will be 
conscious. If biological naturalists like Searle are correct, and natural brain tissue 
itself contains essential properties for creating consciousness, then machine 
brains will not be conscious until such time as those properties can be defined 
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and synthesised artificially. The problem is that we cannot know whether we 
have synthesised the correct properties of neural tissue, or whether we have 
missed a fundamental element, since behavioural evidence that we had 
succeeded would be unreliable. 
EVOLUTIONARY LINK 
Perhaps most importantly, an artificial being will lack a common 
evolutionary link with humans. By recognising that other humans and animals 
are physically and behaviourally similar to ourselves, we infer that they have 
similar origins and, as noted, this makes it reasonable to suppose that their 
behavioural and physical properties have the same function as our own. This 
difference in the method by which the machine’s brain is created may turn out to 
be the most significant factor in determining whether a machine has conscious 
experiences or not. In particular, we ought to expect that a machine developed 
using common “top-down” methods of design may develop conscious behaviour 
without the accompanying subjective states, while a machine that has been 
developed through “bottom-up” methods may be more likely to be phenomenally 
conscious. This is because it may be possible to develop machines through a sort 
of artificial evolution, which replicates the environment in which consciousness 
evolved. In such a situation, the analogy with humans is stronger, since similar 
physical structures and behaviour should have similar evolutionary functions. A 
property like consciousness, that developed from evolutionary processes, likely 
serves a function that gives a being that has it some level of evolutionary 
advantage. Beings that are artificially evolved in relevantly similar circumstances 
should benefit in similar ways from the development of consciousness, and so in 
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this limited case, there are reasons to suppose that a machine that had similar 
behaviour to a natural being, might also possess the appropriate accompanying 
subjective state. 
Nevertheless, there will remain differences between human brains and 
those of any artificially evolved machine that will leave room for doubt; it will be 
impossible to duplicate all the selection pressures that were brought to bear on 
the human brain during its evolution. It is quite possible that our attempts to 
create conscious beings through artificial evolution may result in the creation of 
robot versions of philosophical zombies. Of course, it might be the case that it is 
far easier to create a being that does the same things as an animal if it is also 
conscious. Nicholas Humphrey argues that being able to experience pain and 
pleasure has an evolutionary advantage, since it makes the being care about what 
is happening to it, and presumably this leads to better pain-avoidance behaviour, 
and thus to better survival capabilities81. But even if consciousness creates better 
pain-avoidance in natural environments, it is surely not the only way that such 
behaviour might develop. The extraordinary variety even among natural 
creatures is testament to the many ways that problems can be solved through 
evolutionary means, and given that machines will be composed of different 
materials to natural beings, there is every reason to suppose that different 
solutions could be found to similar problems. Artificial evolution would also likely 
differ from natural evolution in terms of:  
1) The nature of the environment 
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2) Different selection pressures 
3) Vastly different time scales 
4)  The degree that it is consciously controlled and goal-directed  
These all weaken the analogy with naturally-evolved beings and our inference of 
the presence of conscious states in artificially-evolved beings. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF DISANALOGY 
It is clear that requiring more proof for the existence of consciousness 
from a machine is not at all “arbitrary”. There are several relevant differences 
between the behaviour, physical appearance, and the method of creation of 
machines, and those of naturally-evolved beings, that means that the argument by 
analogy is weaker in the case of machines than in that of humans. Note that I have 
not tried to show that machines could not be conscious. In fact, it is possible that 
they could. What I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter is that the 
answer to the question posed at the beginning of the chapter (“Can a machine 
have phenomenally conscious states that are qualitatively good or bad?”) is that 
we cannot know. In our attempts to verify the presence of consciousness in 
artificial beings we only have the natural brain as an example for comparison. 
This makes the Epistemological Problem of Machine Minds more significant than 
some other incarnations of the General Epistemological Problem of Other Minds. 
Since consciousness is irreducibly subjective, the possibility of being able to 
verify the existence of consciousness in another being from an objective 
perspective is very low; we cannot, in fact, verify its existence directly, but only 
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through inference. The argument by analogy, which goes some way to resolving 
the problem in humans and animals, is less successful when used to determine 
whether machines can be conscious, due to several significant differences 
between machines and naturally-evolved beings. This is the third principle of 
utilitarian machine ethics: 
The Principle of Disanalogy: The problem of machine minds is 
greater than the problem of other human minds. 
This will have significant ethical implications, since it seems that if the 
question of whether a machine could be morally considerable rests on their 
ability to have phenomenal consciousness, then as we come to the end of chapter 
3, we remain in doubt as to whether a machine could be morally considerable. In 
the ethical dilemma described earlier, in order to know whether Andrew was 
morally considerable, we needed to know whether or not Andrew could have 
phenomenal states that are qualitatively good or bad. Now, not only do we not 
know whether or not Andrew is the kind of thing that can have these states, but 
even if we did, we could not verify it. We cannot know whether Andrew is 
conscious at any particular time, or for that matter, at any time at all. 
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CHAPTER 4: CAN A MACHINE BE A 
PERSON? 
"As we continue to push our technology forward, and as related technology 
progresses, we expect that Hanson Robotics' robots will evolve into socially 
intelligent beings, capable of love and earning a place in the extended human 
family." 
- Hanson Robotics Vision Statement, 2010
82 
Since robots like Data, or our crew member, Andrew, are behaviourally so 
similar to humans, it is inevitable that we should ask whether they could be 
persons. The answer to this question would have significant implications for our 
dilemma, for if Andrew could be a person, then it would be possible to harm him 
by “killing” him (whether or not a being that is not alive can truly be “killed” is a 
trivial matter. There are ways that we might end the existence of an inorganic 
being, and it is this ending of a being’s existence that is meant here by the term 
“killing”). We already know that it is possible to harm Adam by killing him, since 
Adam is definitely a person. Because the choice we have to make involves sending 
one of the crew to certain death, we know that it would be a bad thing to send 
Adam, and we should avoid it if we can. The situation becomes a genuine dilemma 
if Andrew is also a person, and thus worthy of protection from wrongful death 
too. Is Andrew a person? Could a machine be a person? 
Although there is no one unanimously accepted definition of personhood, 
and many philosophers have offered their own interpretation of what properties 
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a person must have, there is some degree of consensus on what it means to be a 
person. Usually definitions of personhood make reference to three distinct types 
of properties. I have listed each of these types, along with a representative 
example of a description of personhood of the relevant type: 
1) Persons are cognitively special. For example, they are rational... 
[A person is…] a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking 
thing, in different times and places- John Locke 83 
2) Persons are socially special. For example, they can communicate with each 
other, and form relationships... 
[Persons]...belong to a community of rational, valuing beings and 
it thus belongs to the essence of personhood that a person be at 
least in principle capable of communicating, by means of 
symbols and signs, in a shared space of interpersonal meanings 
and shared experience of pleasure, pain, desires, hopes, fears, 
etc. This is, broadly, the notion that what is distinctive about 
persons is the possession of language.-  Keith Price84 
3) Persons are morally special. For example, they can be both moral patients 
and moral agents... 
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The fact is that moral relations...are possible only between 
persons, and that any entity with which one can conceive having 
moral relations would be a person.- Roland Puccetti 85 . 
Of particular importance to the topic at hand is the fact that it is commonly 
accepted that the term "person" is a notion distinct from the term "human being". 
For example, in Rethinking Life and Death, Singers lists great apes, whales, 
dolphins, elephants, monkeys, dogs, and pigs as non-humans that might possibly 
have the right properties to be described as "persons”86. Since the principle of 
equal consideration of interests prohibits us from discriminating against 
machines on the basis of the material from which they are made, there is no 
reason not to attribute personhood to non-biological entities that also possess the 
appropriate properties. If Andrew is conscious, then he could have all of the 
properties usually ascribed to persons. If conscious, Andrew could have: 
1) Interests and goals. 
2) The ability to use language. 
3) The ability to form reciprocal relationships 
4) The ability to understand and apply moral concepts 
5) Rationality 
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6) Self-awareness 
7) A personality 
These are all properties of persons, and are jointly sufficient for personhood. The 
property of being a biological being is never considered a necessary property for 
personhood, and nor should it be. If personhood transcends species barriers, then 
this is because the properties that define personhood are not bound to the 
biology of a human being, and in fact (if it is possible for a non-biological being to 
be conscious) there is no reason why they should be bound to biology at all.  If 
Andrew is conscious, then these properties would endow him with the moral 
protection that the label of personhood implies, and Andrew would have the 
equivalent moral status of a normal adult human. According to the principle of 
equal consideration of interests, to treat Andrew as anything less than a person 
would be substratism, because it would imply that Andrew’s interests are less 
important than those of other beings with the same (morally-relevant) 
properties, because of the material of which he is made (an arbitrary criterion), 
and it would be a position no more defensible than speciesism or racism. All this 
follows from the stipulation that Andrew is conscious. If Andrew is conscious, 
then he is a person. 
But what if he were not conscious? Even without phenomenal 
consciousness, Andrew would still possess many of the characteristics of persons, 
and he would still behave as if he was one. We might call the type of personhood 
that a non-conscious being could have “behavioural personhood”, to signify that a 
being has (at least) the outwardly visible properties of personhood. This 
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distinguishes behavioural personhood from “full personhood”, which consists of 
behavioural personhood as well as the subjective states that we associate with 
personhood, such as self- awareness, intentional states like an understanding of 
language and moral concepts, and future-oriented preferences.  
It seems plausible that machines of the future could have behavioural 
personhood, but what would their moral status be? Is behavioural personhood 
morally equivalent to full personhood? In fact, this seems doubtful; most 
definitions of personhood agree on making at least some reference to 
consciousness (for example, Tooley calls consciousness a necessary “starting 
point” for a definition of personhood, completely ruling out the possibility that a 
non-conscious being could be a person87). This focus on consciousness could be 
considered merely representative of the fact that no beings currently exist that 
have the cognitive, social, and moral capabilities of persons which do not also 
have  consciousness. Perhaps the development of advanced social robots with 
human-like behaviour would lead some philosophers to include some non-
conscious robots in the category of persons. It is more likely though, that the 
focus on consciousness comes from the requirement that a person be a moral 
patient as well as a moral agent. If a being is not sentient, then according to 
Singer, it cannot be harmed. This entails that it cannot be a person, since 
personhood is a moral category, which requires that a being be capable of being 
harmed or benefitted. Moreover, a lack of phenomenal consciousness would have 
implications for the capacity of the being in question to actually have the 
properties predicated of it. We might require that some of the qualities of 
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personhood have their foundation in conscious experience to be genuine 
examples of that quality, so that a non-conscious being could not be said to truly 
possess a particular property if it was not conscious. It is not clear for example, 
whether a being that is not conscious could be said to be capable of having a 
“real” relationship, or if it could be said to “actually” have self-awareness if it did 
not have phenomenal awareness. These are complex issues, but I will stipulate 
that if a being is not conscious, then it cannot have full moral personhood. 
Even though behavioural personhood might not endow its possessor with 
the equivalent moral status of full personhood, some writers on the subject of 
machine rights have stressed the importance of behavioural personhood for a 
machine's moral standing. In Mark Coeckelbergh's 2010 article Robot rights? 
Towards a Social-relational Justification of Moral Consideration, he attempts to 
formulate a way to give moral consideration to particular machines with 
advanced human-like social capabilities88. Coeckelbergh suggests that, because of 
the unusual mix of properties that androids might have (advanced social skills, 
and social roles, but a low probability of consciousness) we might give certain 
robots “soft rights”, while human persons would have “hard rights”89. Steve 
Torrance also acknowledges the unusual place of a human-like robot in our moral 
and social world. Torrance writes that we might have to redefine some of our 
moral concepts to include an understanding of “quasi-moral relationships”90 
between humans and robots, and talks of some humanoid robots as being "para-
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persons"91. Kahn et al. have also suggested that androids might confound some of 
our traditional understandings of the world; they wonder whether the advanced 
social robot might represent “a new technological genre” that blurs the 
distinction between living and non-living or animate and inanimate92. Central to 
all of these claims is a recognition that a non-conscious android would provide us 
with a truly unique case in moral philosophy. Throughout the history of human 
evolution, we have never encountered a being like a non-conscious android 
would be: a being that had highly advanced social and cognitive skills at levels 
equal to or greater than human beings, but which lacked phenomenal 
consciousness. Inspired by the idea of “soft rights” for robots suggested by 
Coeckelbergh, and by Torrance’s suggestion that humanoid robots of the future 
might be “para-persons”93, I suggest that we might distinguish between “soft” 
persons”, “hard” persons, and “fuzzy” persons. “Hard” persons are persons in the 
traditional sense; as most philosophers agree, they must be conscious. “Soft” 
persons are beings that have behavioural personhood, but which lack 
consciousness. “Soft” persons would be very much like the philosophical zombies 
of philosophy-of-mind literature94. A “fuzzy” person is a being that has 
behavioural personhood, but whose consciousness is in doubt. A “fuzzy” person is 
really either a “hard” person or a “soft” person, but we may never know which 
they really are. Because of the Epistemological Problem of Other Minds, all 
persons (apart from oneself) are technically “fuzzy” persons, but reasons were 
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given in the third chapter as to why a machine person would be “fuzzier” than a 
human person. Machines like our crew member Andrew and the character Data 
would certainly be classed as “fuzzy” persons. If a “fuzzy” person turns out to be a 
“hard” person, then their moral status has already been established in this work 
and in many other works on the moral status of persons. If they are a “soft” 
person however, their status is not so clear. We therefore need to establish what 
the moral status of a “soft” person would be, in case any “fuzzy” person is actually 
a “soft” person. 
“SOFT” PERSONHOOD   
What is the moral status of “soft” persons? If behavioural personhood is 
not full moral personhood, where does it stand in relation to it? In Singer's 
worldview, a person is the only being that can be harmed by being killed. Could a 
“soft” person be harmed in this way? Let us examine the reasons given by Singer 
for why it is usually wrong to kill a person, to see whether those reasons might 
also apply to “soft” persons. On a very basic level, Singer claims that killing a 
person deprives them of the ability to experience any pleasure in the future. The 
killing of a person thwarts not only their preference to go on living, but also a 
multitude of preferences for the future that depend on the person's continued 
existence for their satisfaction. But there are more significant wrongs than this; 
else it would be equally wrong to kill a sentient non-person, which Singer denies. 
Singer writes that: “According to preference utilitarianism, an action contrary to 
the preference of any being is, unless this preference is outweighed by contrary 
preferences, wrong. Killing a person who prefers to continue living is therefore 
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wrong, other things being equal.”95, he also writes that “every person has a right 
to life. We have seen that the basic reason for taking this view derives from what 
it means to be a person, a being with awareness of her or his own existence over 
time, and the capacity to have wants and plans for the future.”96 As well as these 
“direct” harms, Singer stresses that there are “indirect” harms that result from the 
killing of a person. These include: the grief caused to the friends and family of the 
person killed; the anxiety caused to other persons who fear for their lives as a 
result of seeing another person killed; and the threat to the “peaceful coexistence 
on which society depends”97 Singer notes that many nonutilitarians consider 
these indirect harms “side effects”, but he highlights their importance for our 
moral judgement of murder, saying, “I am not sure that we should, in the case of 
normal human beings, allow these “side-effects” to be so lightly brushed aside”98. 
It seems quite plausible that a technologically-advanced robot could 
express a preference for continuing to exist. It also seems plausible that it could 
demonstrate by its behaviour that it had this preference. But since sentience is a 
necessary property for a being to have in order for its preferences to be morally 
significant, the preference that the robot expresses for staying alive is not the sort 
of preference that a Singerian utilitarian needs to take into account. In chapter 2 
it was established that non-sentient beings cannot be harmed and that the first 
principle of machine ethics is accordingly that a machine cannot be harmed if it is 
not sentient. But are there reasons to suppose that the harm of killing might be 
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different and that a “soft” person could also be harmed by being killed? Singer 
claims that it is the fact that a being's preference to continue living is thwarted 
that makes killing that being wrong. But why should the preference of a person to 
stay alive be given any consideration by a preference utilitarian at all? After all, it 
is a preference whose dissatisfaction cannot cause any suffering to the being that 
holds the preference (aside from the moment of death perhaps- but this cannot 
be what makes death bad for persons, since sentient non-persons can also 
experience suffering when they die, and Singer holds that murdering a person 
painlessly is usually wrong also). Singer responds to this criticism by claiming: 
“the fact that the victims are not around after the act to lament the fact that their 
preferences have been disregarded is irrelevant. The wrong is done when the 
preference is thwarted.”99 Yet, elsewhere in Singer’s work, he stresses the 
importance of a being’s reaction to having a preference thwarted, in deciding 
whether a being’s preferences are morally considerable. In Practical Ethics, Singer 
writes, "we saw in discussing the ethic of reverence for life that one way of 
establishing that an interest is morally significant is to ask what it is like for the 
entity affected to have that interest unsatisfied."100, he goes on to say that a tree's 
interest in not having its roots flooded is not a morally significant interest 
because "there is nothing that corresponds to what it is like to be a tree dying 
because its roots have been flooded”101. Yet this defence of sentience as a 
necessary criterion for moral considerability undermines Singer's assertion that 
it is a person's preference to continue living that makes it wrong to kill them. 
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After all, there is nothing that it is like for an entity that desires to go on living to 
have that interest unsatisfied. A dead person has just as much awareness of their 
preference to live having gone unsatisfied as a tree does of its roots being flooded. 
It is difficult for a utilitarian to make sense of the moral wrongness of killing a 
person without allowing that some significant harms cannot be experienced. If 
there are such harms, then there seems to be no reason why a being that has no 
capacity for experience could nevertheless be the subject of a harm of this type. A 
“soft” person could conceivably have a preference to continue existing, so what 
reason could be given for denying that the “soft” person’s preference has any 
moral significance? It cannot be because there is nothing that it is like for it to 
have its preference thwarted, since the same is true of normal adult human 
persons. The experience of the harm of death is precisely the same for both “soft” 
and “hard” persons; in both cases there is no such experience. So if it is wrong to 
destroy a “hard” person with a preference to live, then why isn’t it wrong to 
destroy a “soft” person with the same preference? 
Although it is true that a “hard” person cannot experience the 
dissatisfaction of their desire to continue existing, a utilitarian might respond that 
it is possible for them to experience that preference being satisfied. Since a 
preference utilitarian thinks that it is a good thing for preferences to be satisfied, 
it is better to allow a person to continue to exist than to kill them. On the other 
hand, non-sentient beings cannot experience any of their preferences being 
satisfied; so their preferences, including their preference to continue existing, are 
not morally valuable. Only a “hard” person has the ability to conceive of their 
having a future, to desire to have a future, and to experience this desire being 
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satisfied. This is why, a utilitarian could claim, it is worse to kill a “hard” person 
than it is to kill any other category of being, including a “soft” person. 
To say that it would be worse to kill a “hard” person than a “soft” person is 
not to say that it could not still be wrong to kill a “soft” person. There are other 
reasons (aside from those reasons that refer to direct harms to the person) that 
make the murder of a “hard” person wrong, and some of these are possibly also 
reasons for thinking that killing a “soft” person could also be wrong. Consider 
what Singer thinks about whether it would be wrong to kill a newborn baby; 
Singer writes: 
Killing a newborn baby is never equivalent to killing a person, 
that is, a being who wants to go on living. That doesn’t mean that 
it is not almost always a terrible thing to do. It is, but that is 
because most infants are loved and cherished by their parents, 
and to kill an infant is usually to do a great wrong to its 
parents.102 
And again: 
Although a normal newborn baby has no sense of the future, and 
therefore is not a person, that does not mean that it is all right to 
kill such a baby. It only means that the wrong done to the infant 
is not as great as the wrong that would be done to a person who 
was killed. But in our society there are many couples who would 
be very happy to love and care for that child. Hence even if the 
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parents do not want their own child, it would be wrong to kill 
it.103 
Here, Singer argues for the wrongness of killing a being solely on the basis of 
indirect harms and benefits. Since the “soft” person has behavioural personhood, 
could some of the same indirect harms and benefits result from the killing of a 
“soft” person as from the killing of a “hard” person? Certainly, it seems plausible 
that the death of a “soft” person might cause grief to others, and that the killing of 
a “soft” person might disrupt the “peaceful coexistence on which society 
depends”. Whether or not a “soft” person's murder could cause anxiety amongst 
sentient beings about the possibility of their own murder might depend on how 
much the androids resemble human persons, but it is not too difficult to imagine 
this type of harm also resulting from an android’s murder. 
One way in which we can make sense of the wrongness of killing without 
referring to directly experienced harms done to the being themselves is by 
acknowledging the distress that the death could cause to others, as Singer does 
above. Another way this might be done is by appealing to what might be termed 
the “aesthetic value” that bearers of behavioural personhood possess. Peter 
Harrison has made a similar argument regarding the treatment of non-human 
animals. According to Harrison, even if animals were not morally considerable 
because they were not sentient, animals would still have an aesthetic value that 
makes them the kind of thing that we ought to protect, rather than destroy, and 
he compares them to a work of art: 
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Briefly, it would be morally wrong to attack Michelangelo’s 
'Pieta' with a hammer, despite the fact that this beautifully 
crafted piece of marble cannot feel pain. If animals are mere 
machines, they are, for all that, intricate and beautiful machines 
(most of them), which like old buildings, trees and works of art, 
can greatly enrich our lives. Accordingly, rational arguments can 
be mounted against acts which would damage or destroy 
them.104 
Harrison is surely correct in recognising that the end of an animal’s life results in 
the loss of a subject with unique aesthetic value. How much more “intricate and 
beautiful” would a machine with behavioural personhood be? James Rachels 
argues that it is a person's possession of a “biographical” life that gives their life 
more value than that of a non-person105.  Rachels claims death is bad for a person  
because it ends a life filled with goals, dreams, relationships, and all the things 
that we associate with the “biography” of a person. Moreover, it is worse to kill a 
person than a non-person because the added complexity of the life of a person 
adds value to their life; Rachels writes: 
A young woman dies: it is bad because she will not get to raise 
her children, finish her novel, learn French, improve her 
backhand or do what she wanted for Oxfam; her talents will 
remain undeveloped, her aspirations unfulfilled. Not nearly so 
much of this kind could be said about a less sophisticated being. 
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Her death is worse because there are more reasons for 
regretting it.106 
The complexity of some machines could very well allow them to have what would 
be termed a biographical life; this is what makes them interesting characters in 
science fiction. According to William Ruddick, the notion of “biographical lives” 
allows us to make sense of harms that can come to a person without their 
awareness, including those harms that might occur after death. Ruddick claims 
that a biographical life can act as a “post-mortem surrogate” for a person, “a 
surrogate that can be harmed or benefited – and further extended – by what 
others do or say after the liver’s death.”107 If it is biographical lives that we value 
particularly about persons, then (since there is no reason (in theory) why a non-
conscious being couldn't have a biographical life), a “soft” person could have at 
least one property of personhood that makes it wrong to end a person’s life and it 
might indeed be wrong to kill a “soft” person. This helps us to make sense of why 
the loss of a non-conscious person would seem like harm even if we would 
struggle to point to the being that was harmed. If it is bad for a person to die 
because it marks the end of a biography or personality, then it can be bad for a 
machine that has these things to “die” also. Killing a “soft” person is not as bad as 
killing a “hard” person, because it doesn’t stop any morally important preferences 
being satisfied, but it may still be wrong to do it. 
There are a number of other ways that the murder of a “soft” person could 
cause harm, which also fit the category of indirect harms. There is the need to be 
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pragmatically “polite” enough to a socially-capable being that it behaves in a way 
that doesn’t endanger you or others. If machines are in roles in which they can 
harm or benefit others, and are sensitive to social or moral slights, it would be 
prudent for human beings to provide machines with the means to meet their 
needs, and to treat them in whatever manner best provides for the smooth 
functioning of society. In this respect, the question of how to treat social machines 
is quite similar to that of how to treat existing machines like cars108 and 
computers; in both types of cases we ought to be aware that machines have needs 
(e.g. for oil, power, and maintenance) and that neglecting those needs will lead to 
inefficiency and perhaps injuries or deaths109. In the case of social machines, their 
needs could possibly involve psychological needs, such as the need to be treated 
fairly, and with respect. If the machine is in a position to hinder or help humans 
(which many could perhaps be), then there is a strong pragmatic case for treating 
the machine with fairness and respect, even if there is no possibility that the 
machine could experience the suffering that would be caused to a human person 
in an equivalent position. 
We may also wish to satisfy the preferences of “soft” persons to avoid 
social and psychological problems that could arise from people, especially young 
children, having violent or anti-social interactions with beings that are physically 
and behaviourally similar to human persons. If a person commits acts of violence 
against beings that cry out and exhibit pain behaviour, then there could be a 
possibility that they will repeat these acts against sentient beings. Kant used a 
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similar argument against the ill-treatment of animals, suggesting that there would 
be a “brutalisation” effect from the mistreatment of animals that might spill over 
into any subsequent human interactions a person had110. There are surely 
reasons to believe that this brutalisation effect, if it exists, would be stronger if a 
person were to perform violent acts upon a being that resembled a human 
person, and it is troubling to imagine what sort of effect it might have on a child 
for them to grow up accustomed to ignoring the needs of person-like agents. 
There could be social and educational benefit to be gained from teaching our 
children to be equally kind to “soft” persons as they are to “hard” persons.  
There are a significant number of harms involved in the killing of a “soft” 
person that may be described as indirect harms, because they do not refer 
directly to the experience of the being in question. The killing of a “soft” person, 
while not a harm to the “soft” person themselves, and not as harmful as the killing 
of a “hard” person, nevertheless has the potential to cause significant harm. This 
is the fourth principle of utilitarian machine ethics: 
The Principle of Indirect Harm: The value of satisfying or 
frustrating the apparent preferences of any machine will be at 
least as bad or good as any indirect harms or benefits that result. 
“M” 
Using the principles developed thus far in this thesis, we can create an 
equation that allows us to see the expected harms or benefits that could result 
from an action that satisfies or frustrates a machine’s apparent preference. Let “I” 
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signify the sum of any indirect harms or benefits of the action (any harms or 
benefits that are not directly experienced by the machine itself, but may be 
experienced by other beings that are sentient); let “D” signify the sum of any 
direct harms or benefits of the action (any harms or benefits that would be 
directly experienced by the machine itself, if it were sentient); and let “x” signify 
the degree of doubt that we hold about any claim that the machine is conscious. 
The equation “M” looks like this: 
M = I+D× (1-x) 
Where: 
M = the expected utility value from an action satisfying or 
frustrating the apparent preferences of a machine 
I= Indirect harms or benefits  
D= Direct harms or benefits 
x= the degree of doubt that we hold about any claim that 
the machine is conscious 
This equation shows that the expected harms or benefits that could result from 
an action that satisfies or frustrates a machine’s apparent preference are least as 
good or bad as any indirect harms or benefits that result. It then allows for any 
direct harms or benefits that might result, but these are reduced by a percentage 
that depends on the level of doubt we hold about any claim that the machine is 
conscious.  
Using this equation helps to resolve problems like the Spaceship Captain’s 
Dilemma. To do this, we simply need to compare the value of “M” for the crew 
member Andrew in this scenario with the value of “H”, an analogous equation for 
an action involving the preferences of Adam, the human crew member. The 
equation “H” looks like this: 
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H= I+D× (1-y) 
Where: 
H = the expected utility value from an action satisfying or 
frustrating the preferences of a human 
I= Indirect harms or benefits  
D= Direct harms or benefits 
y= the degree of doubt that we hold about any claim that 
the human is conscious 
We cannot know the exact value of either “x” in “M”or “y” in “H”. Because of the 
Problem of Other Human Minds, the value of “y” in “H” will be greater than zero 
(there is always the chance that a human person is a natural zombie), but a 
rational person must admit that would not be much greater than zero; we have 
excellent reasons to believe that other humans are conscious. But, in chapter 3, 
reasons were given as to why there is less reason to suppose that a machine is 
conscious than to suppose that a fellow human is conscious; the Problem of 
Machine Minds was shown to be greater than the Problem of Other Human Minds. 
This means that, regardless of the value of “y” in “H”, the value of “x” in “M” will 
always be greater. So, in situations where the values of all other variables are 
equal (as we might suppose they are in the Spaceship Captain’s Dilemma), the 
value of “M” will represent less expected utility value than the value of “H”. The 
same is true of a situation involving a choice between the interests of artificial 
non-persons or natural non-persons. The interest of an apparently sentient 
natural being in avoiding pain should outweigh the interest of an apparently 
sentient artificial being in avoiding pain. Since there is a greater level of doubt 
about the existence of the machine’s mind than the animal’s, then the likelihood 
of getting a positive utility value from an action showing preference to the 
machine is less than the likelihood of getting the same utility value from an action 
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showing preference to a natural animal. We have thus arrived at the final 
principle of utilitarian machine ethics: 
The Principle of Inequality: The expected utility value of an 
action satisfying the preference of a machine is always less than 
the expected utility value of an action satisfying the equivalent 
preference of an animal (human or non-human). 
Here, the term “equivalent preference” signifies that the values of “I” and 
“D” are considered the more or less the same for “M” as they are for “H”. Any 
decision that weighs up the preferences of machines against the equivalent 
preferences of animals should be weighted against machines. If a decision 
involves a choice between satisfying the equivalent preferences of equal numbers 
of machines and animals (human or non-human), then the choice should be made 
that satisfies the preferences of the animals. 
In the Spaceship Captain’s Dilemma, we can see that we must choose 
between the destruction of Adam (a “hard” person), or Andrew, who is a “fuzzy” 
person (either a “soft” person or a “hard” person). If Andrew is conscious, then he 
is a “hard” person, and he is of equal moral worth to Adam. If he is a “soft” person 
then his death will be at least as bad as any indirect harms that result, but no 
direct harms would affect Andrew as they would affect Adam. This means that to 
send Andrew to certain death could only be as bad as sending Adam, but we also 
know that it could not be worse. Although it is entirely possible that if we sent 
Andrew to his “death”, then we would send a being with full moral personhood to 
be destroyed, and thus lose something of equal moral value to Adam, the extra 
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level of doubt surrounding Andrew’s consciousness means there is more chance 
in Andrew’s case that this will not happen. It is less of a risk to send Andrew on 
the mission, and this is what we must do. 
Let us now consider two frequently cited problems in machine ethics that 
the five principles described in this thesis and the equation “M” might be applied 
to. First, let us consider the claim that it might be wrong to switch off a machine 
that is asking not to be. For example, James Geary speculates that in the future we 
will have robots that are “kind of high-tech pets” and that: “turning one off will be 
the moral equivalent of shooting your dog”111. While Rodney Brooks has said that 
he will feel he has completed his robot 'Cog', when people feel guilty about 
turning it off112. Turning off a machine is not really analogous to anything in 
human or animal terms, and certainly not murder. One of murder’s most salient 
characteristics is its finality, but currently many electronic machines can be 
switched off or unplugged for long periods of time, then can usually be switched 
on again without the object having been damaged in any way (the closest parallel 
to something in human terms might be an anaesthetic). The same might very well 
be true of very complex social machines, even those that could be conscious. 
Perhaps we ought to add the proviso that a machine should not be shut down 
permanently. Or consider a thought experiment suggested by Roland Puccetti113: 
Suppose that Simon comes home to find his girlfriend Sally having sex with his 
best friend. In a fit of jealous rage, Simon beats and stabs Sally to death. It just so 
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happens that, unbeknownst to Simon, Sally is a robot. Should Simon be charged 
with murder? Has Simon done anything morally wrong? 
Murder is one of the most significant harms that can be done to a person, 
so in this situation, the value of “D” (the sum of the direct harms or benefits that 
result from the action) in “M” will represent an appropriately large disutility 
value. But since we don’t know the value of the variable “x”, we can’t tell whether 
the value of “D” will have much effect on the final value of “M”. However, since the 
value of “x” has no bearing on the value of I (the sum of the direct harms or 
benefits that result from the action), we may still judge Simon’s actions as wrong, 
whether Sally is conscious or not, based on the value of “I”. The principle of 
necessary sentience and the principle of indirect harm tell us that if Sally is not 
sentient, then the harm involved in her murder can only be indirect harm, the 
type of harm that is caused to those that are not the subject of the action. The fact 
that Simon has lived with Sally as his girlfriend without realising that she was a 
robot, and that she perhaps developed another intimate relationship with his best 
friend, suggests that Simon has not only broken an object, but has also ended a 
biographical life. Sally is no longer able to fill the social role that she previously 
had, the kind of role that currently can only be filled by persons. The world has 
lost a personality, along with all the idiosyncrasies, plans, projects, creative 
output, and relationships that come along with one. The killing of Sally might also 
involve: grief caused to the friends and family of the person killed; threat to the 
“peaceful coexistence on which society depends”; Simon himself being 
“brutalised” by his actions; economic loss (from the loss of a valuable artefact and 
the loss of future profit that might have been created by Sally in her job); the loss 
of Sally as a receptacle of cultural information; the loss of an artefact that has 
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aesthetic value. All these are sufficient to say that Simon was wrong to do what he 
did, and probably also, depending on the scale of the harm, that he ought to be 
legally punished for it.  
Another problem in machine ethics is whether or not it would be wrong to 
keep machines with person-like behaviour as slaves. This is the way in which 
machines are usually treated in the Star Wars movies, for example. Joanna Bryson 
has argued that slavery is “the correct metaphor we should use when thinking 
about our relationship with robot companions”114, and thinks that it would be 
wrong to create machines “friend” that we owe obligations to, because the 
protection of these machines would involve the use of valuable resources that 
ought to be used for the benefit of humans115. Similarly, Mark Walker argues that 
if we could use robots to do some of the dangerous work that humans now have 
to do, then we might be morally obliged to make robot slaves, to avoid deaths and 
injuries to human persons116. However, Walker also claims that if robots were 
like us, then we would be guilty of substratism if we allowed them to be slaves. 
Walker is correct if saying that a robot is “like us” means that the machine is 
sentient, but if “like us” just means that the machine has “human-like” behaviour, 
then this does not necessarily mean the machine is sentient. The charge of 
substratism only applies when we have violated the principle of equal 
consideration, which in turn only applies to beings with the same morally-
relevant properties.  Walker admits that we wouldn’t know whether or not a 
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machine was sentient, but he claims that, to allow machines as slaves “we would 
need a high degree of certainty…that robots or computers are not conscious, for 
otherwise we risk mistreating persons in one of the worst ways.”117 The 
principles I have argued for lead to a different conclusion. The principle of 
inequality says that the expected utility value of an action satisfying the 
preference of a machine is always less than the expected utility value of an action 
satisfying the equivalent preference of an animal. The human worker’s preference 
to avoid death and injury as a result of his work outweighs the machine’s 
equivalent preference; this would remain true as long as the preferences of the 
machine were equivalent to those of the human. However, this would not justify 
the use of machines as slaves for trivial human needs, unless the value of “x” in 
“M” for the machine (representing the degree of doubt we hold about the 
possibility of the machine being conscious) was thought to be sufficiently high, as 
it is in the case of currently existing machines. On the other hand, it would mean 
that making robots to help in roles in which a loss of life was likely, would not just 
be acceptable, but morally obligatory.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
“PICARD: Commander Data, what are you doing now?  
DATA: I am taking part in a legal hearing to determine my rights and status. Am I 
a person or property?  
PICARD: And what's at stake?  
DATA: My right to choose. Perhaps my very life.  
PICARD: My rights. My status. My right to choose. My life. It seems reasonably 
self aware to me. Commander? I'm waiting.  
MADDOX: This is exceedingly difficult...” 118 
Star Trek: The Next Generation - The Measure Of A Man 
Science fiction robots like Data provide intriguing examples of beings at 
the margins of our moral circle of concern. If such a being existed, would it be 
possible to harm it? How should we treat it?  In this thesis, I have examined the 
question of whether a machine could be morally considerable from a utilitarian 
perspective, and in particular, from the perspective of the work of Peter Singer.  
In doing so, I have developed several principles of utilitarian machine ethics that 
provide a schema for where particularly advanced machines with human-like 
behaviour could fit into our worldview.  
A utilitarian machine ethic holds that sentience is both necessary and 
sufficient for moral considerability, and utilitarians must take care to avoid 
substratism. Like racism, sexism, and speciesism, substratism describes an 
irrational moral prejudice (in this case, a prejudice against a being that is made 
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from a different type of material to oneself). The second chapter gave us our first 
two principles of machine ethics: 
1) The Principle of Necessary Sentience: If a machine is not 
sentient, then it cannot be harmed. 
2) The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: If a machine 
is sentient, then its preferences should be considered as important 
as the equivalent preferences (“in so far as rough comparisons can 
be made”) of other sentient beings. 
I have described sentience as consisting of conscious states that are qualitatively 
good or bad, and it must be stressed that consciousness should be understood as 
phenomenal states that have a feel; there must be something that is like to be 
having that state. Because of this, it is important in machine ethics to differentiate 
between thinking and consciousness. 
In the third chapter, I addressed the question of whether or not a machine 
could have phenomenally-conscious states that are qualitatively good or bad. 
This is an exceedingly difficult question to answer, but because the methods we 
use to tell if another being is conscious are unreliable in the case of machines, 
then the proper attitude toward machine consciousness is agnosticism. I have 
argued that the Problem of Machine Minds is more problematic than the Problem 
of Other Human Minds or the Problem of Animal Minds, and this is our third 
principle of utilitarian machine ethics: 
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3) The Principle of Disanalogy: The Problem of Machine Minds is 
greater than the Problem of Other Human Minds. 
In chapter 4, I introduced a distinction between a “hard” person, a “soft” 
person, and a “fuzzy” person. A “hard” person is described by the familiar 
definitions of person. A “soft” person has behavioural personhood, but is not 
conscious, and a machine like Data would be a “fuzzy” person (either a “hard” 
person or a “soft” person). A “soft” person would have indirect value, but could 
not be directly harmed. In this chapter, I introduced the fourth principle of 
utilitarian machine ethics: 
4) The Principle of Indirect Harm: The value of satisfying or 
frustrating the apparent preferences of any machine will be at 
least as bad or good as any  indirect harms or benefits that result. 
The equation “M” provides a simple way of understanding our obligations 
towards machines. Any action satisfying or frustrating a machine’s preference is 
at least as good or bad as any indirect harms or benefits that result. The 
possibility that we might cause direct harms to a machine is represented in the 
equation by the variable “D”, but the value of “D” is appropriately discounted by 
any level of doubt that we hold about the machine being conscious. Because of the 
extra level of doubt about the consciousness of machines, the interests of a 
naturally-occurring being should be preferred over the interests of a machine 
with similar behavioural properties; the final principle of utilitarian machine 
ethics: 
[81] 
 
5) The Principle of Inequality: The expected utility value of an 
action satisfying the preference of a machine is always less than 
the expected utility value of an action satisfying the equivalent 
preference of an animal (human or non-human). 
I have demonstrated that these principles may be applied to some significant 
problems in machine ethics, and it is hoped that they could provide guidance in 
many more such cases. 
This thesis demonstrates the importance of attempting to find a solution to 
the Problem of Other Minds. If this significant problem can be overcome, then the 
variables “x” and “y” in the equations described in this thesis might be replaced 
with known quantities, and the moral status of machines would be all the more 
clear.   
[82] 
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